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Abstract 
 
 
The problem of efficiency versus fairness is considered in relation to the splitting of 
costs for shared facilities between the users. This is considered as a result of a 
problem of sharing the cost of the provision of central computing facilities between 
different faculties in a large university, but the basic problem is widespread. A Linear  
Programming model is considered in order to minimise cost. The dual of this model is 
shown to correspond to an efficient allocation of costs. An alternative optimal dual 
solution is shown to give a ‘fair’ solution according to criteria resulting from 
cooperative game theory. 
 
Keywords:   Cost Allocation, Efficiency, Fairness, Linear Programming, Duality, 
Game Theory 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When different consumers share the use of common facilities the problem of how 
much to charge each consumer for its share of the cost of each facility arises. While it 
is reasonable that each consumer be charged the marginal cost of its usage it is not 
clear how much of the fixed cost it should be charged. There is no unambiguous 
answer. Notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ (themselves ambiguous, see, for example 
Rawls 1) may suggest one division. Economic efficiency may suggest another. These 
aims are not, however, diametrically opposed as will be seen in subsequent sections. 
They are, however, clearly not the same. 
 
The problem we are considering arose in the allocation of central computing facilities 
and services in a large university. Technological change over the last decade has 
resulted in decentralisation of computing power to personal computers, although there 
is still some need among specialist users for very powerful mainframes. However 
there are still arguments in favour of some centralisation of services and the provision 
of services. These considerations gave rise to some faculties in the university 
considering ‘going it alone’ with their own provision (possibly from private 
companies) or forming consortia with other faculties with similar needs and tendering 
for the provision of external services. The final solution was however, both on 
grounds of cost and control, to continue with one centrally provided service. This was 
argued to be the most efficient solution. However it was considered unacceptable for 
individual faculties, or groups of faculties, to pay more than they would by going it 
alone. This was the fairness criterion. The full problem is described in section 4. 
Some aspects and monetary figures have been changed to preserve confidentiality. 
The problem is, however, part of a more general problem which we will discuss. 
 
The general problem of finding an efficient allocation of facilities to different 
‘customers’ so as to maximise revenue or overall utility or to minimise cost can be 
formulated as a Linear (LP) or Integer (IP) Programming model. The dual of such a 
model gives an allocation of costs to the customers which can be regarded as the most 
‘efficient’ (see, for example Williams 2, 3 and Biddle and Steinberg 4). 
 
For a ‘fair’ allocation we can use a model from Cooperative Game Theory. This 
model can itself be solved by Linear Programming. It is similar to the dual model 
mentioned above but has a different objective function. 
 
Examples where problems of a similar nature arise, and have been studied, are: 
 
Allocating the costs of railway stations to the lines that use them. (Rhys 5, also 
discussed in Williams 6). 
 
Allocating the fixed (set-up) costs of electricity generation to different classes of 
consumer (discussed in Williams 6). 
 
Allocating the costs of airport runways to the different airlines that use them. 
(Littlechild and Thompson  7 ). 
 4
 
Allocating the cost of building a dam, to create a reservoir, among the different uses 
to which it might be put (hydro-electric generation, recreation, flood control etc.). 
This is discussed in relation to the Tennessee Valley Authority by Ransmeier 8. 
 
Dividing Credit Card costs fairly (Thomas 9). 
 
The whole problem can be seen as a microcosm of a central problem of political 
organisation; reconciling fairness and equity of wealth with economic efficiency. 
 
 
 
2. THE BASIC PROBLEM 
 
We have a set of Facilities F = {1,2,..,m} serving a set of  ‘customers’   
C = {1,2,..,n}. 
 
Customer j requires one of the facilities in F  F for each k kj ⊂ ε  K , ie customer j 
requires at least one of F , and at least one of F  etc. 
j
1
j
2
j
 
The fixed cost of i ε  F is f i . 
 
Customer j produces a benefit (revenue) b . j
 
It may not be desirable to cater for all the customers or provide all the facilities. 
 
F could be a set of railway stations, electric generators, airport runways of different 
lengths, dams of possible heights, factories, swimming pools or cash card dispensers. 
Corresponding to each of these C would be a set of railway lines, electricity 
consumers, aircraft types, reservoir users, domestic consumers, swimming pool users 
or brands of credit card. 
 
If a facility i is provided its cost f i  must be split up among the customers j that use it 
in an acceptable or desirable way. 
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3. AN OPTIMISATION MODEL 
 
Primal Model 
 
We formulate a 0-1 Integer Programming model. 
 
Variables 
 
               iδ  = 1 if facility i  is provided 
                    = 0  otherwise 
 
 
               jγ   = 1 if customer j is catered for 
                      =  0 otherwise 
 
Objective 
 
         Maximise      ∑ b  
j
j jγ  -    ∑i f i δ i                                          (1) 
 
Constraints 
 
                                all j 0       ≤− ∑
k
jFi
ij
ε
δγ ε  C, all k ε  Kj      (2) 
 
                                   1                          all j ≤γ j ε  C                         (3) 
                              
                                                        all i 0≥δ i ε  F                         (4) 
 
 
We refer to the above model as P. 
 
Constraints (2) force at least one of F  to be provided, for each j and k, if customer j 
is to be served. It is not necessary to impose non-negativity conditions on the 
k
j
γ  
variables or append upper bounds of 1 on the δ  variables. These conditions are 
guaranteed by the structure of the model. 
 
There is no guarantee that this general model will produce integer solutions if solved 
as a Linear Programme. In certain special cases, however, integral solutions to the LP 
are guaranteed. For example if for all j and k | F | = 1 then this is the case. This is 
discussed in, for example, Williams 
k
j
6 and illustrated there by the example of Rhys 5. 
In that case a railway line requires exactly two terminal stations. Integrality is also 
guaranteed (trivially) when there are no distinct benefits b, only costs, the costs are 
subadditive ie sharing of facilities will not produce an increase in cost, but usually a 
decrease, and there is a facility which can serve all customers. Such a condition often 
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applies in practice and is the case in the example which we consider in section 4 of 
this paper. 
 
When the LP solution is integer then there is a well defined dual LP model (see eg 
Dantzig 10 ). If this is not the case then there are a number of possible duals, all 
lacking some of the properties of the LP dual. For convenience of exposition we 
postpone discussion of this issue. It is covered by, for example, Williams 2 . 
 
We consider the dual of the LP relaxation of the above model. (For convenience we 
have reversed the direction of some of the constraints in the formal dual model) 
 
Dual Model (of LP Relaxation) 
 
      Minimise             ∑                                                              (5) 
Cj
j
ε
u
 
      Subject to:          =   b       all j ∑+
j
vu      
Kk
j
ε
k
j j ε  C                (6) 
 
                                       ∑
k
iFjj ε :
v kj ≤ f i          all i ε  F                   (7) 
                                        jKkε
 
                                             ,    0           all j ju
k
jv ≥ ε  C, k ε  K   (8) j
 
 
We refer to the above model as D. 
  can be interpreted as the portion of the fixed cost f i  of each of the facilities i (for 
k
k
jv
ε K ) that j requires. In the case that a customer is not catered for the  can be 
ignored. 
j
k
jv
 
  can be interpreted as the excess benefit (revenue) which j obtains after 
contributing all the required costs. The objective is to minimise the total excess. 
ju
 
Constraints (7) split the cost f i  between the customers using the facility. Should the 
full cost not be met (the constraint is non-binding) the orthogonality result of LP 
guarantees that iδ  = 0, ie that the facility not be built. Hence there is no question of 
customers contributing more, in total, than they would if they were sharing an 
alternative facility. This is one of the conditions of ‘fairness’ discussed in the next 
section. 
 
Constraints (6) split the benefits to customers between the imputed costs and 
excesses. 
Generally there will be a number of alternate optimal dual solutions. Among these 
alternate solutions will be, a solution that could be regarded as, the fairest solution, in 
a sense to be defined in section 5. That the ‘fairest’ solution is among those cost 
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allocations that are consistent with the most efficient solution is of significance. This 
is proved in section 5 and illustrated by the example in section 6. 
 
 
4. THE ALLOCATION OF COMPUTING FACILITIES 
 
This problem arose in a large university where decisions had to be made about the 
provision of academic computing facilities. The university has nine faculties: 
 
Veterinary Science 
Medicine 
Architecture 
Engineering  
Arts 
Commerce 
Agriculture 
Science 
Social Science 
 
The university wanted to retain one computer services department providing support, 
servicing individual personal computers and laboratories as well as networking and 
providing specialist high powered computing and software. It also turned out that this 
was the most cost effective solution for the university as a whole. Individual faculties, 
however, argued, with some justification, that they could sometimes obtain these 
services more cheaply using other suppliers. Also certain faculties had similar needs  
and could form consortia to get even better deals. 
 
The yearly fixed costs for the individual faculties ‘going it alone’ (ie seeking outside 
provision) were estimated to be (in £100 000). 
 
Veterinary Science         6 
Medicine                        7 
Architecture                   2 
Engineering                   10 
Arts                              18 
Commerce                    30 
Agriculture                    11 
Science                         29 
Social Science                7 
 
The possible consortia with their yearly estimated fixed costs of obtaining 
independent provision were: 
 
1. (Veterinary Science, Medicine)                                             11 
2. (Architecture, Engineering)                                                   14 
3. (Arts, Social Science)                                                           22 
4. (Agriculture, Science)                                                           37 
5. (Veterinary Science, Medicine, Agriculture, Science)             46 
6. (Arts, Commerce, Social Science)                                        50 
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Central provision (consortium 7) for all faculties would have a yearly fixed cost of 96. 
 
No individual ‘benefits’ (over and above cost savings) to faculties from going it alone 
or joining consortia were quantified.  
 
The model P can be simplified, for this example, by setting all the γ  variables to 1. 
There are no b coefficients and |K | = 1 for all j, making such sets (and indices k) 
superfluous.  
j
 
It becomes 
 
Minimise                     ∑ f ii δ i                                                 (9) 
 
Subject to: 
 
                                  all j 1 ≥∑
jFi
i
ε
δ ε  C (Faculties)                      (10) 
                              
                                         all i 0≥δ i ε  F (Individual provisions and 
                                                                                    consortia)            (11) 
 
It is clear from the above figures that the most efficient solution, from the university’s 
point of view, was to ‘force’ every faculty to use the central provision, resulting in the 
integer solution to the (LP) model where only the δ  variable corresponding to this 
provision is 1. 
 
Of interest, however, is the corresponding dual model. D.  
 
 
          Maximise             ∑                                                         (12) 
Cj
j
ε
v
 
 
          Subject  to:         ∑
jFij
j
ε:
v ≤ f i        all i ε  F                  (13) 
                                                
 
                                                 0      all j jv ≥ ε  C               (14) 
 
Interpreting the dual variables  as the allocation of part of the cost of the central 
provision to faculty j, we see that the constraints guarantee that no faculty, or 
consortium of faculties, is charged more, in total, than they would by going it alone. 
This is one (but not the only) requirement of fairness. The objective is to maximise 
the total cost allocation. An  optimal solution to this dual model is to make the 
following allocation of the cost of central provision: 
jv
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Faculty                        Cost Allocation                  Saving from individual provision 
 
Veterinary Science 6 0 
Medicine 3 4 
Architecture 2 0 
Engineering 0 10 
Arts 11 7 
Commerce 30 0 
Agriculture 8 3 
Science 29 0 
Social Science 7 0 
 
Consortium                                                                       Savings 
 
(Veterinary Science, Medicine) 2 
(Architecture, Engineering) 9 
(Arts, Social Science) 7 
(Agriculture, Science) 0 
(Veterinary Science, Medicine, Agriculture, Science) 0 
(Arts, Commerce, Social Science) 5 
 
 
Not surprisingly (as a result of the duality theorem of LP ) the optimal solution 
exactly meets the cost (96) of the ( optimal ) central provision (the corresponding 
constraint  (13) is binding ). It can be observed that no faculty or consortium is 
charged more than would be the case with its alternative provision. It also follows 
from the duality theorem of LP that since the primal model is feasible and not 
unbounded there will be a feasible dual solution ie there will be an allocation of costs 
which is ‘fair’ in the above, restricted, sense. There are, however, many alternate dual 
solutions some of which might be ‘fairer’. The existence of alternate dual solutions 
would be expected from a model with this structure (the primal model exhibits 
‘degeneracy’). 
 
We now explore the issue of ‘fairness’ and demonstrate that among the alternate cost 
allocations we can find a fairer one. 
 
Such a fairer one will, however, almost certainly not be a ‘basic’ one (in the 
terminology of LP). 
 
 
 
5. A FAIRNESS MODEL 
 
The issue of fairness in cost allocation has been explored by Shubik 12, and in the 
book edited by Peyton Young 13, using concepts from Cooperative Game Theory. 
For an allocation to be ‘fair’ it must lie in the ‘core’. This amounts to satisfying the 
constraints of the dual model above. Such an allocation would give players in a 
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cooperative game an incentive to join a coalition as their overall payoff (negated cost) 
would be improved. Within the core there will generally be at least one, and normally 
many, solutions. A number of criteria exist for choosing a solution from the core. The 
most popular is probably the Shapley Value (see Shubik 12 ). We, alternatively, use 
the nucleolus. This is an attempt to find the solution which is most ‘central’ to the 
core (see eg Young 13 ) in the sense that the savings to the ‘customers’ from not using 
alternative coalitions (aggregated over the coalitions) is as nearly as possible equal. 
 
To make this concept precise we maximise the minimum saving over each coalition. 
We also include all the possible fictional coalitions, whose costs can be regarded as 
the minimal sum of the costs of any coalitions and the alternative individual provision 
of the members of the coalition. If there are alternatives then we minimise the number 
of coalitions with this saving, repeating the procedure with the coalition with next 
smallest saving and so on (giving what is known as the lexicographic minimum).  
 
Since a fair solution is not something about which there is ever likely to be consensus 
 we anticipate objections which might be raised to the solution given below. A variety   
 of fairness criteria are discussed in the seminal paper of Yaari and Bar-Hillel 13   . 
They conducted a series of experiments to see which of  nine possible criteria were 
 considered most fair by a sample of people questioned. In relation to needs (as 
 opposed to the more subjective qualities of tastes and beliefs) an allocation based on 
 minimising the maximum inequality was overwhelmingly considered the most fair. 
 This accords with the criterion we are using here. 
 
Formally, relating this to the dual model in section 3, we introduce slack variables s   
into the constraints (7) and create a new objective to give the model 
 
 
             Maximise(Minimum  s i )                                                       (16) 
                      i 
 
             Subject to:  =   b       all j ∑+
jKk
j     
ε
vu kj j ε  C                    (17) 
 
                         +    s i        =   f i        all i ∑
k
jFj : i
k
j
  
v
ε
ε  F                    (18) 
                    jKkε
                                             ,    ≥   0         all j ju kjv ε  C, k ε  K                 (19) j
 
 
In the dual model, in section 3, it was not necessary to create constraints for the 
fictional coalitions since they must be satisfied automatically and therefore be 
redundant. 
 
The objective can be dealt with by introducing a variable z and constraints  
 
 
                                       z      ≤   s i                   all i ε  F              (20) 
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The objective then becomes  
 
                                           Maximise         z 
 
 
We refer to the above model as F.  
 
A variant, which could be considered fairer, is to seek the per capita nucleolis. To do 
this we inversely weight the slack variables by the size of each coalition to which they 
correspond. 
 
It is interesting to note that whereas the dual model to D is obviously P (reflexivity of 
the duality relation), even when P gives an integral solution, the dual model to F will, 
in general, not give an integral solution and has no obvious interpretation. This means 
that obtaining a ‘fair’ allocation of costs has to be modelled directly and does not 
emerge from the dual values of any obvious facility location model. 
 
When we have found an optimal solution to F we will need to fix the objective at the 
optimal value and further optimise on sections of the model to find the lexicographic 
minimum. 
 
Theorem 
 
An optimal solution to F will also be an optimal solution to D. 
 
Proof: 
 
Suppose we have an optimal solution v * to F which is not an optimal solution v  to 
D 
j
+
j
ie       <                                                                                 (21) ∑
j
j
*v ∑ +
j
jv
 
Consider each of those constraints (18) in which the maximum s i  is attained. Each of 
these constraints must contain at least one variable v *  which occurs only in 
constraints involving a subset of constraints (7) which are not binding. Otherwise 
maximising (12) over all the constraints (18) containing this variable would contradict 
the subadditivity condition on the f i . 
j
 
It is therefore possible to increase the value of each of these variables reducing the 
values of the maximal s i  and contradicting our hypothesis. 
 
This result shows that the seeking of a fair solution is not at variance with the seeking 
of an optimal solution. Rather, among the different cost allocations which are 
consistent with the optimal solution, we must seek that one which minimises the 
savings in the manner described above. We illustrate this by means of our example. 
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6.   A FAIR ALLOCATION OF THE COSTS OF COMPUTER 
PROVISION 
 
We specialise model F to the example. 
This gives the following cost allocation: 
 
Faculty                  Cost Allocation              Savings from own Provision 
 
Veterinary Science 4 2 
Medicine 1 6 
Architecture 0 2 
Engineering 8 2 
Arts 15 3 
Commerce                         28                                                 2 
Agriculture 8 3 
Science 27 2 
Social Science                     5                                                  2 
 
Consortium                                                                      Savings 
 
(Veterinary Science, Medicine)                                   6     
(Architecture, Engineering)                                             6 
(Arts, Social Science)                                                      2 
(Agriculture, Science)                                                         2 
(Veterinary Science, Medicine, Agriculture, Science)       6 
(Arts, Commerce, Social Science)                                       2  
 
Savings for the fictional coalitions are not given. 
 
Note that the total cost allocation is again 96 (the cost of central provision) and that 
no faculty or consortium would pay more than it would by alternative provision. What 
is more the allocation of costs is more equitable in that there is less disparity in 
savings. 
 
If we  weight the savings inversely by the sizes of the coalitions (the per capita 
nucleolis) we obtain the following allocation: 
 
Faculty                  Cost Allocation              Savings from own Provision 
 
Veterinary Science            1.83                                           4.17 
Medicine                            5                                                2 
Architecture                       0                                                2                               
Engineering                       7.5                   2.5 
Arts                                    16                                              2 
Commerce                         24.67                                         5.33  
Agriculture                        9                                                 2 
Science                              27                                               2    
Social Science                   5                                                 2 
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Consortium                                                                      Savings 
 
(Veterinary Science, Medicine)                                            4.17                 
(Architecture, Engineering)                                                  6.5                
(Arts, Social Science)                                                           1            
(Agriculture, Science)                                                           1          
(Veterinary Science, Medicine, Agriculture, Science)         3.17 
(Arts, Commerce, Social Science)                                        4.33    
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
We demonstrate that, in certain problems, considerations of efficiency (optimality) 
and fairness in the allocation of the costs of shared facilities are not necessarily 
opposed. However a ‘fair’ allocation may be only one of a number of efficient 
allocations. We are not asserting that the solutions produced are ‘fair’ in any absolute 
sense but hoping that they help to clarify the concept. 
 
This result arises when the Linear Programming formulation of the facility allocation 
problem has an integer solution, and therefore a well-defined dual. When this is not 
the case there are a number of alternative ways of defining a dual with more limited 
properties. The value of these duals in providing a satisfactory allocation of costs will 
form the subject of another paper. 
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